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Abstract
Background: Professional societies use metrics to evaluate medical schools’ policies regarding interactions of students and
faculty with the pharmaceutical and medical device industries. We compared these metrics and determined which US
medical schools’ industry interaction policies were associated with student behaviors.
Methods and Findings: Using survey responses from a national sample of 1,610 US medical students, we compared their
reported industry interactions with their schools’ American Medical Student Association (AMSA) PharmFree Scorecard and
average Institute on Medicine as a Profession (IMAP) Conflicts of Interest Policy Database score. We used hierarchical logistic
regression models to determine the association between policies and students’ gift acceptance, interactions with marketing
representatives, and perceived adequacy of faculty–industry separation. We adjusted for year in training, medical school
size, and level of US National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. We used LASSO regression models to identify specific
policies associated with the outcomes. We found that IMAP and AMSA scores had similar median values (1.75 [interquartile
range 1.50–2.00] versus 1.77 [1.50–2.18], adjusted to compare scores on the same scale). Scores on AMSA and IMAP shared
policy dimensions were not closely correlated (gift policies, r=0.28, 95% CI 0.11–0.44; marketing representative access
policies, r=0.51, 95% CI 0.36–0.63). Students from schools with the most stringent industry interaction policies were less
likely to report receiving gifts (AMSA score, odds ratio [OR]: 0.37, 95% CI 0.19–0.72; IMAP score, OR 0.45, 95% CI 0.19–1.04)
and less likely to interact with marketing representatives (AMSA score, OR 0.33, 95% CI 0.15–0.69; IMAP score, OR 0.37, 95%
CI 0.14–0.95) than students from schools with the lowest ranked policy scores. The association became nonsignificant when
fully adjusted for NIH funding level, whereas adjusting for year of education, size of school, and publicly versus privately
funded school did not alter the association. Policies limiting gifts, meals, and speaking bureaus were associated with
students reporting having not received gifts and having not interacted with marketing representatives. Policy dimensions
reflecting the regulation of industry involvement in educational activities (e.g., continuing medical education, travel
compensation, and scholarships) were associated with perceived separation between faculty and industry. The study is
limited by potential for recall bias and the cross-sectional nature of the survey, as school curricula and industry interaction
policies may have changed since the time of the survey administration and study analysis.
Conclusions: As medical schools review policies regulating medical students’ industry interactions, limitations on receipt of
gifts and meals and participation of faculty in speaking bureaus should be emphasized, and policy makers should pay
greater attention to less research-intensive institutions.
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Introduction
Interactions between health care professionals and the prescrip-
tion drug and medical device industries are common, especially in
academic medical centers [1]. Such relationships can be contro-
versial in the context of medical education and physician training
[2–6]. Several studies have documented the interactions between
drug and device companies and trainees at all levels, from
providing textbooks and other gifts to first-year medical students to
funding continuing medical education (CME) programs for
practitioners [7–10]. Critics have charged that such interactions
can impart biased information and may contribute to a ‘‘hidden
curriculum’’ that reduces trainees’ skepticism about potentially
misleading promotional claims [11–16]. Studies have shown that
this biased information can increase non-evidence-based prescrib-
ing and increase the cost of patient care [17–19].
To address these concerns, in the past decade numerous teaching
hospitals and medical schools in the US have sought to isolate
trainees from industry through policies limiting the activities of
marketing representatives on campus [20–24]. Development of
such policies has been supported by expert professional groups and
medical societies such as the Institute of Medicine, the Association
of American Medical Colleges, the American Board of Internal
Medicine Foundation, the American Medical Student Association
(AMSA), and the Institute on Medicine as a Profession (IMAP).
Among these, AMSA and IMAP have also created scales—
respectively, the AMSA PharmFree Scorecard and the IMAP
Conflicts of Interest Policy Database—to evaluate the strength of
institutions’ policies around these issues [25–27].
In a recent survey of first-year and fourth-year US medical
students, Austad et al. showed that trainees express substantial
enthusiasm for limiting the involvement of industry marketing in
medical education, although trainee acceptance of commercially
sponsored gifts and meals has continued [25]. The survey also
found that the level of US National Institutes of Health (NIH)
research funding at a given medical school was a strong predictor
of student behavior, with students at schools receiving NIH
research support above the median institutional funding level less
likely to report receiving gifts from industry than students at non-
research-intensive schools. However, the impact of other institu-
tional factors on trainees’ behavior remains unclear.
We used data fromAustad et al.’ssurvey to further investigate the
relationship between trainees’ interactions with industry represen-
tatives and key characteristics of their medical schools, particularly
the strength of policies regarding interactions between institutions
and industry. Our goal was to determine which medical school
characteristics and which conflict of interest policy dimensions were
most predictive of students’ reported behaviors.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at
Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard Law School.
Study Population and Survey Administration
Survey design and administration were described in detail by
Austad et al. [25]. In brief, a nationwide random sample of US
medical students was identified from the American Medical
Association Masterfile (n=3,495; 14 first-year students each
from 120 US allopathic medical schools [one school had missing
data for first-year students] and 15 fourth-year students each
from 121 US allopathic medical schools; 231 medical students
were excluded from the analysis because of inaccurate mailing
addresses). Here, we focus on three issues previously reported to
be of importance [28] reflecting students’ marketing interactions
with industry and students’ learning environments: (1) students’
reported receipt of gifts and meals, (2) their discussions with
pharmaceutical representatives about drug products, and (3)
perceptions of the adequacy of separation between medical
school faculty members and the pharmaceutical industry. We
considered responses to the following questions.
1. ‘‘Which of the following have you received in the last six
months from drug, device, or other medically related
companies?’’ Five options were listed: ‘‘food or beverage in
the workplace,’’ ‘‘free drug samples,’’ ‘‘a meal outside of
campus or hospital,’’ ‘‘pens, notepads, T-shirts,’’ and ‘‘any
other gift or financial support.’’ A positive response to any of
these was considered as receipt of a gift.
2. ‘‘Which of the following interactions have you experienced
in the past six months?’’ A ‘‘yes’’ response to ‘‘talked with
a pharmaceutical representative about a company’s prod-
ucts’’ was coded as having interacted with a marketing
representative.
3. ‘‘In your experience, how much do you agree or disagree with
the following statements regarding your institution?’’ One
statement offered was ‘‘I believe that there is adequate
separation between the Faculty of Medicine at my university
and the pharmaceutical industry.’’ Possible answers were
‘‘strongly agree,’’ ‘‘agree,’’ ‘‘disagree,’’ and ‘‘strongly disagree.’’
We dichotomized responses between respondents who an-
swered ‘‘strongly agree’’ and ‘‘agree’’ versus those who
answered ‘‘disagree’’ or ‘‘strongly disagree.’’
The survey provided a US$2 honorarium [29] and received
responses from 1,610 first-year and fourth-year medical students
(representing a 49.3% response rate).
Medical School–Industry Interactions Ranking Data
The policy dimensions evaluated by the AMSA PharmFree
Scorecard and the IMAP Conflicts of Interest Policy Database fall
into three categories of regulation: (1) individual–industry inter-
actions, (2) institutional–industry interactions, and (3) industry
involvement in educational activities. In 2010, the AMSA
PharmFree Scorecard evaluated 11 dimensions of medical schools’
industry interaction policies and assigned a value from one to
three, with one being the lowest score possible (least restrictive)
and three being the highest (most restrictive) [25]. The 11
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disclosure, marketing representative access, samples, purchasing/
formulary committee participation, travel compensation, on-site
educational events, scholarships, and medical school curriculum.
To determine an overall ‘‘AMSA score,’’ we calculated the mean
industry interaction policy score for each school using the 2010
data from AMSA across these 11 dimensions.
Next, as part of its 2010 PharmFree Scorecard, AMSA assigned
a letter grade to each school on an A/B/C/D/F scale, with A
reflecting the tightest controls on industry interaction. For each
school, AMSA calculated this letter grade by taking the total
cumulative score of the policy dimension scores of marketing
representative access, samples, purchasing/formulary committee
participation, and the top three policy dimension scores in each of
the following two categories of regulation: individual–industry
interactions (dimensions were gifts, consulting, speaking bureaus,
and disclosure) and industry involvement in educational activities
(dimensions were travel compensation, on-site educational events,
scholarships, and medical school curriculum). The remaining
fourth dimension with the lowest score in each of these categories
was not calculated by AMSA as part of the cumulative score. The
total cumulative score was then divided by the total possible score
and multiplied by 100 to give a percentage. For percentages $
85%, $70% and ,85%, $60% and ,70%, $40% and ,60%,
and ,40%, AMSA assigned letter grades of A, B, C, D, and F,
respectively. For each school, we converted the letter grade to a
numerical value, with A–F corresponding to 4–0, to arrive at an
‘‘AMSA grade.’’
Also in 2010, IMAP evaluated 12 policy dimensions on a 0–3
scale: meals, gifts, consulting, honoraria, speaking bureaus,
marketing representative access, samples, purchasing/formulary
committee participation, travel compensation, continuing medical
education, scholarships, and ghostwriting [26]. We calculated an
overall ‘‘IMAP score’’ as the average score on these 12 dimensions.
Statistical Analysis
We calculated summary statistics for each policy score and each
scored dimension, including medians and interquartile ranges
(IQRs). We also calculated the linear correlation in overall AMSA
score and IMAP score, as well as scores assigned to policy
dimensions that were shared between the two criteria, including
policies on industry gifts, marketing representative access, drug
samples, and faculty consulting [30]. We considered a correlation
coefficient r=0 to 0.25 to signify no association, r=0.26 to 0.5 to
indicate a fair association, r=0.51 to 0.75 to indicate a moderate
association, and r.0.75 to indicate a strong association [30].
We fit several hierarchical logistic regression models to estimate
the association between these policy scores and students’ self-
reported behavior or perceptions. All models included a binary
indicator of the behavior or perception as the dependent variable,
a random intercept for medical school, and a fixed linear effect for
the policy score. For each of the three survey questions and each
industry interaction policy record (AMSA grade, AMSA score,
and IMAP score), we estimated the association of the school’s
policy score with trainees’ reported outcomes with increasing levels
of adjustment, including (1) no adjustment, (2) adjustment for
student year in training (first versus fourth), (3) adjustment for year
in training and quartiles of medical school size, based on student
enrollment, and (4) adjustment for year in training, medical school
size, and a binary indicator of NIH funding, split at the median
value (US$94.2 million) in 2010.
To compare the AMSA grade, AMSA score, and IMAP score
despite their different value ranges, we transformed the estimated
odds ratios (ORs) from the logistic regression models to represent
the magnitude of difference in trainees’ responses between
institutions with the most restrictive policies (e.g., highest possible
scores) to those with the least restrictive policies (e.g., lowest
possible scores), even if no schools actually achieved these scores.
The transformed AMSA score, IMAP score, and AMSA grade
required the raising of the estimated OR to the second power,
third power, and fourth power, respectively. We also estimated the
corresponding probabilities of responses to industry interaction
questions for students from schools with the most and least
restrictive policies. For a direct comparison of the calculated mean
values of the AMSA grade, AMSA score, and IMAP score, the
AMSA grade and AMSA score were recalibrated to the same 0–3
scale used in the IMAP score.
Finally, we estimated two exploratory logistic regression models
to identify the specific policy dimensions from each score that were
most strongly associated with student behaviors for the three
outcomes of interest: receiving gifts, interaction with marketing
representatives, and perceived adequacy of faculty and industry
separation. The first model used all IMAP dimensions as
independent variables in a model predicting student behavior,
and the second model used all AMSA dimensions as the
independent variables. We used the LASSO (least absolute
shrinkage and selection operator) approach, a penalized likelihood
method for model estimation that performs simultaneous variable
selection and coefficient estimation to produce a parsimonious list
of predictors [31,32]. We used the glmnet package in R (version
3.0.0, R Project for Statistical Computing), and implemented
LASSO with cross-validation in order to choose an appropriate
penalty parameter.
Results
Characteristics of Medical Schools
Of the 121 US allopathic medical schools analyzed in this study,
39% (n=47) were classified as private institutions. At the time of
the survey, a ‘‘typical’’ US medical school enrolled a median
number of 639 students, received US$94 million in NIH research
funds, and had 890 faculty members (Table 1). The AMSA score
ranked 63% (n=76) of the schools as having the most restrictive
category of industry interaction policies (score .2 to 3), while the
IMAP score ranked 67% (n=81) of school policies in the
intermediate restrictive level (score .1 to 2).
Correlation of Responses to Outcomes of Interest
Students who reported interacting with a marketing represen-
tative were more than twice as likely to have reported receiving a
gift (relative risk [RR] 2.60, 95% CI 2.39–2.95, p,0.0001) than
students who did not interact with a marketing representative.
There was no significant association between students receiving
gifts and students’ perception of adequacy of faculty separation
from the industry (RR 0.92, 95% CI 0.77–1.09) or between
students’ interaction with a marketing representative and the
students’ perception of adequacy of faculty separation from the
industry (RR 1.00, 95% CI 0.78–1.29).
Characteristics of AMSA and IMAP Ranking Systems
The dimensions that comprised the 2010 AMSA and IMAP
ranking systems are reported in Table 2, along with summary
statistics for the overall scores. The AMSA and IMAP ranking
systems consisted of three general categories of regulation: (1)
individual–industry interactions, (2) institutional–industry interac-
tions, and (3) industry involvement in educational activities. There
were eight overlapping policy dimensions and three and four non-
overlapping dimensions, respectively, in the AMSA and IMAP
Predictors of Student–Industry Interactions
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1.50–2.00) similar to that of the AMSA score (1.77, IQR 1.50–
2.18).
The AMSA grade, determined by the nine best-scoring AMSA
dimensions out of 11 possible dimensions, had the highest median
value (2.25, IQR 1.50–2.25), indicating that it was the least
stringent score of the three evaluated.
The linear correlations among the policy dimensions shared by
AMSA and IMAP are also reported in Table 2; overall, they
demonstrated only fair to moderate correlations, even though they
assessed similar policies. The scoring of gift policies (r=0.28, 95%
CI 0.11–0.44), purchasing and formulary committee policies
(r=0.48, 95% CI 0.31–0.60), travel compensation policies
(r=0.45, 95% CI 0.30–0.58), and scholarship policies (r=0.47,
95% CI 0.32–0.60) had fair correlations between AMSA and
IMAP. We found stronger correlations for consulting policies
(r=0.59, 95% CI 0.46–0.70), speaking bureau policies (r=0.52,
95% CI 0.37–0.63), marketing representative access policies
(r=0.51, 95% CI 0.36–0.63), and sample policies (r=0.51,
95% CI 0.37–0.63), although the 95% CIs largely overlapped
between those classified as fair versus moderate according to
correlation coefficients.
Table 1. Medical school characteristics (n=121).
Characteristic Result
Median (IQR) number of enrolled students 639 (478, 761)
Median (IQR) annual NIH research funding
(million US dollars)
94.2 (28.1, 196.9)
Median (IQR) size of medical school faculty 890 (477, 1,405)
IMAP score, proportion of school distribution
Least restrictive policies 13% (n=16)
Intermediate restrictive policies 63% (n=76)
Most restrictive policies 24% (n=29)
AMSA score, proportion of school distribution
Least restrictive policies 6% (n=7)
Intermediate restrictive policies 27% (n=33)
Most restrictive policies 67% (n=81)
Least restrictive policies correspond to IMAP and AMSA scores of 0 to 1;
intermediate restrictive policies are scores .1 to 2; most restrictive policies
correspond to scores .2t o3 .
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001743.t001
Table 2. Comparison of industry interaction policy dimensions in the AMSA and IMAP ranking systems.
Scoring Dimension Dimension Definition
Median (IQR)
AMSA Value
Median (IQR)
IMAP Value
Correlation
Coefficient (95% CI)
Individual–industry interactions
Meals Acceptance of meals paid for by the industry n/a 2 (2, 3) —
Gifts Acceptance of gifts of any value
a 3 (1.5, 3) 2 (2, 3) 0.28 (0.11, 0.44)
Consulting Consulting relationships, excluding scientific
research and speaking
1.5 (1.5, 3) 1 (1, 2) 0.59 (0.46, 0.70)
Honoraria Financial compensation given for services provided
that traditionally do not require compensation
n/a 1 (0, 2) —
Speaking bureaus Financial compensation for speaking on behalf of
companies at conferences and educational events
1.5 (0, 1.5) 1 (1, 2) 0.52 (0.37, 0.63)
Disclosure Disclosure of financial relationships with the
industry
1.5 (0, 1.5) n/a —
Institutional–industry interactions
Marketing representative access Interaction with sales representatives 1.5 (1.5, 1.5) 2 (2, 2) 0.51 (0.36, 0.63)
Samples Receipt of drug samples or vouchers for patient use 1.5 (0, 1.5) 1 (1, 3) 0.51 (0.37, 0.63)
Purchasing/formulary committee
participation
Limitations on individuals with industry financial ties
serving on purchasing or formulary committees
3 (1.5, 3) 0 (0, 2) 0.48 (0.31, 0.60)
Industry involvement in educational
activities
Travel compensation Acceptance of industry financial support to attend
meetings and educational events
3 (1.5, 3) 2 (1, 3) 0.45 (0.30, 0.58)
On-site educational events Industry-sponsored events held on campus 1.5 (1.5, 1.5) n/a —
CME Industry sponsorship of CME events n/a 1 (1, 1) —
Scholarships Industry earmarking or sponsoring training of
a specific individual
1.5 (0, 1.5) 3 (3, 3) 0.47 (0.32, 0.60)
Medical school curriculum Medical student training on institutional conflict of
interest policies
1.5, (0, 3) n/a n/a
Ghostwriting Written work published under the name of health
care personnel that was written in part or in full by
pharmaceutical industry staff or paid writers
n/a 0 (0,3) —
Overall score 1.77 (1.5, 2.18) 1.75 (1.5, 2) 0.69 (0.59, 0.78)
aThe AMSA PharmFree Scorecard includes meals in this category.
n/a, not applicable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001743.t002
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systems showed a moderate to strong relationship among the
overall scores. Unsurprisingly, the AMSA grade and AMSA score
demonstrated the strongest correlation (r=0.88, 95% CI 0.84–
0.92). This was followed by IMAP score and AMSA score
(r=0.69, 95% CI 0.59–0.78), and IMAP score and AMSA grade
(r=0.51, 95% CI 0.37–0.63).
Association of Scores with Student Responses
The associations of student responses with institutional policies
are presented in Figure 1. In the unadjusted model, students were
less likely to report receiving a gift from a marketing representative
in schools with a higher AMSA grade (unadjusted OR 0.38, 95%
CI 0.23–0.64) or an AMSA score indicating tighter policies
(unadjusted OR 0.37, 95% CI 0.19–0.72). The IMAP score was
also related to this outcome, but was not statistically significant
(unadjusted OR 0.45, 95% CI 0.19–1.04). When we adjusted for
year in training and medical school size in partially adjusted
models, the relationship did not change substantially. However,
adding NIH funding level to the fully adjusted model attenuated
the relationship between all three policy scores and the outcome of
receiving an industry gift (AMSA grade, fully adjusted OR [aOR]
0.78, 95% CI 0.32–1.29; AMSA score, aOR 0.64, 95% CI 0.32–
1.29; IMAP score, aOR 0.68, 95% CI 0.29–1.58). The unadjusted
ORs correspond to estimates of 56%–70% for the likelihood of
receiving any industry-sponsored gifts for students from schools
with the least possible restrictive policies compared to 37%–46%
for students from schools with the most possible restrictive policies.
This effect suggests that a school’s NIH funding level is an
important confounder of the relationship between policies,
whether measured by AMSA or IMAP, and student behavior.
The outcome of meeting with marketing representatives showed
a similar pattern. Students were 50%–70% times less likely to
interact with marketing representatives in schools with higher scores
on the AMSA and IMAP ranking systems (AMSA grade,
unadjusted OR 0.36, 95% CI 0.20–0.65; AMSA score, unadjusted
OR 0.33, 95% CI 0.15–0.69; IMAP score, unadjusted OR 0.37,
95% CI 0.14–0.95). The partially adjusted models did not alter this
relationship. Again, including NIH funding level in the fully
adjusted model substantially diminished the association with school
policy, such that the relationships were no longer statistically
significant (AMSA grade, aOR 0.71, 95% CI 0.37–1.35; AMSA
score, aOR 0.50, 95% CI 0.23–1.08; IMAP score, aOR 0.58, 95%
CI 0.22–1.51). Unadjusted ORs correspond to estimates of 47%–
59% and 23%–32% for the likelihood of discussing industry
products with marketing representatives for students at schools with
the most and least restrictive policies, respectively.
Students’ perceptions of the adequacy of faculty–industry
separation at their institutions showed an opposite pattern for
the AMSA systems. In the unadjusted and partially adjusted
models, there was a nonsignificant relationship between the
AMSA grade and AMSA score and students’ perceptions about
faculty–industry separation at their medical schools. The ORs
correspond to an estimated 80%–91% and 93%–97% likelihood
of believing there is adequate separation between the faculty and
industry at schools with the most and least restrictive policies,
respectively. However, in the fully adjusted model including NIH
funding, the AMSA score was significantly associated with the
strength of the policy (aOR 4.63, 95% CI 1.41–15.24).
By contrast, the IMAP score was significantly associated with
students’ reports of adequate separation between faculty and
industry in both the unadjusted model (OR 8.15, 95% CI 2.43–
27.30) and the fully adjusted model (aOR 10.95, 95% CI 2.81–
42.65).
We also explored other ways of modeling NIH funding (e.g., in
quartiles) and other institutional characteristics (e.g., private versus
public school and the size of medical school faculties) and
consistently found that NIH funding level was a significant
confounder of the association between school policies and self-
reported student behavior and attitudes (Figure S1).
Predictors of Student Responses
The policy dimensions selected by the LASSO regression
models as most predictive of each student response outcome are
shown in Table 3. As this analysis is exploratory and because
accurate estimates of model uncertainty are not straightforward
from LASSO, we do not report coefficient values and confidence
intervals; instead, we focus on which dimensions were selected for
model inclusion based on their explanatory value in the model.
Many of the policies governing individual–industry relationships,
such as those limiting gifts, meals, and speaking bureaus, were
associated with students’ reports of receiving no gifts and not
interacting with marketing representatives. Policy dimensions
associated with the regulation of industry involvement in
educational activities (e.g., CME, travel compensation, and
scholarships) were not associated with answers to questions
relating to receiving gifts or marketing representative interactions,
but were associated with perceived separation between faculty and
industry. Regulation of gifts was the only policy area consistently
associated with students’ reports of not receiving gifts and not
interacting with marketing representatives, and with increased
students’ perception of faculty’s adequacy of separation from the
industry.
Discussion
In the past decade, many US medical schools have instituted
policies regulating student and faculty interactions with the
pharmaceutical and device industries, but few studies have
analyzed the effects of these policies on trainees’ attitudes and
behaviors. We found that students at schools with more rigorous
industry interaction policies, as measured by both AMSA and
IMAP rating methods, were significantly more likely to report
they had not received gifts in the past 6 mo, had not interacted
with industry marketing representatives in the past 6 mo, and
perceived adequate separation of faculty and industry at their
schools. We also found that NIH research funding was a strong
predictor and important confounding variable with regard to the
outcomes of receiving gifts and reporting interactions with
marketing representatives. However, level of NIH funding was
not a confounder for the outcome of students’ perception of
adequate separation between faculty and the pharmaceutical
industry, which was associated with both AMSA and IMAP
scores.
A number of possibleexplanations exist for the association ofNIH
funding level with students’ self-reported behaviors and perceptions
concerning industry. First, institutions with greater NIH funding
likely have more experience with industry interaction policies. The
NIH has long paid close attention to conflicts of interest among its
funded investigators [33]. Therefore, when pressure—from sources
such as students or the media—arose to reduce industry interactions
such as gifts and meals, schools with a history of NIH funding and
other government contracts had more experience in instituting and
implementing such rules. Another possibility is that the enactment
and implementation of industry interaction policies requires
substantial resources, including dedicated compliance officers, that
are more likely to be found in resource-rich schools. By contrast,
schools with lower levelsofNIH funding may be moredependent on
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budget. Thus, institutions with lower NIH funding levels may have
disincentives to developing strong policies insulating students and
faculty members from industry.
Student responses concerning the adequacy of separation
between the school faculty and industry were likely influenced
most by the very existence of industry interaction policies, as
compared to the other two questions that reflected the actual
execution of the policies. If an academic medical center has a
strong industry relations policy but enforces it poorly or continues
to permit interactions off campus or at satellite hospitals and
clinics, then students at that institution would likely respond to our
survey questions by perceiving adequate separation of their faculty
while still reporting receipt of gifts and other interactions with
Figure 1. Association between strength of medical school industry interaction policies and survey responses. Outcome comparing
schools with the most restrictive policies and schools with the least restrictive policies for receipt of gifts (top), interaction with marketing
representatives (middle), and perceived adequacy of faculty–industry separation (bottom). For example, in the unadjusted AMSA grade scoring
system, students from schools with the most restrictive policies had about 60% less odds of receiving gifts compared to those from a school with the
least restrictive policies. The fully adjusted model included the year in training, size of the medical student population, and a dichotomous measureo f
NIH funding. NIH funding is a measure of the amount of government-funded basic science research occurring at the medical school. High NIH
funding was defined as above the median value (US$94.2 million) for all medical schools in 2010 (compared to schools below the median value).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001743.g001
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quarters (74%) of schools in 2010 had oversight policies in place to
ensure compliance, while 26% did not. In addition, the majority of
schools (68%) reported mechanisms to sanction noncompliance
with the regulations. As industry interaction policies continue to
evolve, the policies should be designed to cover all affiliated
student rotations and be meaningfully enforced.
Given that the AMSA and IMAP scoring systems covered
overlapping components of medical schools’ industry interaction
policies, we expected that they would behave similarly in our
analyses, but they differed in some cases. It is possible that each
scoring system measures policies through different evaluative
schema. Generally, we found that the mean AMSA score was
more precise than the AMSA grade, which is consistent with the
fact that the grade does not evaluate the entire component score.
The AMSA PharmFree Scorecard program revised its scoring
procedures this year; subsequent national surveys should assess
whether the new version better accounts for implementation of
school policies and better predicts students’ receipt of gifts and
interactions with industry [34].
We found that restricting receipt of gifts was the single
interaction policy most often related to the outcomes we assessed.
Policies banning gifts were associated not only with reduced
reports of receipt of industry gifts by students, but also with fewer
interactions with pharmaceutical marketing representatives overall
and greater perception of adequate separation between the faculty
and industry. These results suggest that as US academic medical
centers look to create or reform regulations on industry
interactions for medical students, limiting receipt of gifts should
be a central feature of the policies. Medical trainees who receive
even small-value gifts from marketing representatives have been
found to have more favorable attitudes towards pharmaceutical
products and marketing representatives and tend to believe they
are immune to the biases that can arise from such interactions
[12,13,28,35,36]. A recent study by Mintzes and colleagues
pointed out that such interactions can lead to important negative
clinical outcomes [37]. Institutional policies regulating industry-
sponsored educational activities, such as stringent limits on
industry-sponsored CME, travel, and scholarships, seem to exert
the most influence over trainees’ perceptions of the adequacy of
separation between their schools’ faculties and the pharmaceutical
industry. These types of educational activities are particularly
high-profile and may draw trainees’ attention to industry’s
involvement in education [38].
Our study is limited by recall and other social biases inherent
to survey studies. In addition, our study was cross-sectional in
nature, and thus does not take into account recent changes that
institutions might have made to their industry interaction policies.
Student behavior is likely shaped by informal and formal school
curricula, which are both likely related to the strength of industry
interaction policies at a particular school. Since the survey was
conducted in 2011 and the analysis was performed using the 2010
AMSA and IMAP databases, some curricula may have been
altered by the time of the survey administration. However,
changes in institutional culture are often slow, which may delay
the adoption and implementation of conflict of interest policies
[27]. Assessment of the scoring systems studied assumes that the
dimensions measured by these policies are validated and
adequately capture the numerous factors that predict trainee–
industry interactions. In spite of this, the policy dimensions
measured by the AMSA and IMAP ranking systems reflect
attempts at regulating the most common industry marketing
practices [39,40]. Our study population was composed of a
national sample of trainees, thus minimizing the threat to the
external validity of our findings and making the findings more
generalizable. The response rate was within the range of response
rates achieved in studies of medical professionals [41,42].
Numerous sensitivity checks performed on the respondent
population showed no evidence of sampling bias [25].
Industry interaction policies at academic medical centers are
intended to insulate trainees from the biases that such interactions
can create [18,19]. Our study demonstrates that multiple policy
dimensions are associated with trainee-reported behaviors and
attitudes, though certain policies, such as gift-giving, appear most
fundamental. Furthermore, the level of NIH funding, which may
serve as a proxy for familiarity with conflict of interest regulations,
strongly influences the association between student reports of
industry interactions and policies regarding student–industry
interactions. As academic medical centers limit industry access,
industry marketing representatives may focus efforts on less
research-intensive institutions that permit greater access to the
next generation of physicians [43–46]. Leaders in medical
education will need to continue to assess the nature and
effectiveness of institutional policies.
Table 3. Policy dimensions selected by LASSO as predictors to student responses.
Student Response to Survey Question AMSA Dimensions Regarding Policies IMAP Dimensions Regarding Policies
Receipt of gift Gifts Q
Speaking bureaus Q
Purchasing/formulary committee Q
Meals Q
Purchasing/formulary committee Q
Interaction with a representative Gifts Q
Consulting Q
Speaking bureaus Q
Speaking bureaus Q
Perceived adequate separation between faculty
and industry
Purchasing/formulary committee q
Travel compensation q
Gifts q
Samples q
CME q
Consulting Q
Honoraria Q
Travel compensation q
Scholarships q
The direction of the arrow indicates whether the presence of a school policy is associated with student agreement with the survey question (arrow pointing up) or
disagreement with the survey question (arrow pointing down). For example, the AMSA gift policy dimension was associated with reduced reported receipt of gifts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001743.t003
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Figure S1 Sensitivity analysis ofassociation of strength of
school interaction policies and student survey responses.
Outcome comparing schools with the most restrictive policies and
schools with the least restrictive policies for receipt of gifts (top),
interaction with marketing representatives (middle), and perceived
adequacy of faculty–industry separation (bottom). Model 1 adjusts
for year in training, size of medical student population, and a
quartile split of 2010 NIH funding level. Model 2 adjusts for year in
training, size of medical student population, quartile split of 2010
NIH funding level, quartile split of size of medical school faculty,
and status as a private institution.
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Background. Making and selling prescription drugs and
medical devices is big business. To promote their products,
pharmaceutical and medical device companies build rela-
tionships with physicians by providing information on new
drugs, by organizing educational meetings and sponsored
events, and by giving gifts. Financial relationships begin early
in physicians’ careers, with companies providing textbooks
and other gifts to first-year medical students. In medical
school settings, manufacturers may help to inform trainees
and physicians about developments in health care, but they
also create the potential for harm to patients and health care
systems. These interactions may, for example, reduce
trainees’ and trained physicians’ skepticism about potentially
misleading promotional claims and may encourage physi-
cians to prescribe new medications, which are often more
expensive than similar unbranded (generic) drugs and more
likely to be recalled for safety reasons than older drugs. To
address these and other concerns about the potential career-
long effects of interactions between medical trainees and
industry, many teaching hospitals and medical schools have
introduced policies to limit such interactions. The develop-
ment of these policies has been supported by expert
professional groups and medical societies, some of which
have created scales to evaluate the strength of the
implemented industry interaction policies.
Why Was This Study Done? The impact of policies
designed to limit interactions between students and industry
on student behavior is unclear, and it is not known which
aspects of the policies are most predictive of student
behavior. This information is needed to ensure that the
policies are working and to identify ways to improve them.
Here, the researchers investigate which medical school
characteristics and which aspects of industry interaction
policies are most predictive of students’ reported behaviors
and beliefs by comparing information collected in a national
survey of US medical students with the strength of their
schools’ industry interaction policies measured on two
scales—the American Medical Student Association (AMSA)
PharmFree Scorecard and the Institute on Medicine as a
Profession (IMAP) Conflicts of Interest Policy Database.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
compared information about reported gift acceptance,
interactions with marketing representatives, and the per-
ceived adequacy of faculty–industry separation collected
from 1,610 medical students at 121 US medical schools with
AMSA and IMAP scores for the schools evaluated a year
earlier. Students at schools with the highest ranked
interaction policies based on the AMSA score were 63% less
likely to accept gifts as students at the lowest ranked
schools. Students at the highest ranked schools based on the
IMAP score were about half as likely to accept gifts as
students at the lowest ranked schools, although this finding
was not statistically significant (it could be a chance finding).
Similarly, students at the highest ranked schools were 70%
less likely to interact with sales representatives as students at
the lowest ranked schools. These associations became
statistically nonsignificant after controlling for the amount
of research funding each school received from the US
National Institutes of Health (NIH). Policies limiting gifts,
meals, and being a part of speaking bureaus (where
companies pay speakers to present information about the
drugs for dinners and other events) were associated with
students’ reports of receiving no gifts and of non-interaction
with sales representatives. Finally, policies regulating indus-
try involvement in educational activities were associated
with the perceived separation between faculty and industry,
which was regarded as adequate by most of the students at
schools with such policies.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest
that policies designed to limit industry interactions with
medical students need to address multiple aspects of these
interactionstoachievechangesinthebehaviorandattitudesof
trainees, but that policies limiting gifts, meals, and speaking
bureaus may be particularly important. These findings also
suggest that the level of NIH funding plays an important role in
students’ self-reported behaviors and their perceptions of
industry, possibly because institutions with greater NIH funding
have the resources needed to implement effective policies. The
accuracy of these findings may be limited by recall bias
(students may have reported their experiences inaccurately),
and by the possibility that industry interaction policies may
have changed in the year that elapsed between policy grading
and the student survey. Nevertheless, these findings suggest
that limitations on gifts should be emphasized when academic
medical centers refine their policies on interactions between
medical students and industry and that particular attention
should be paid to the design and implementation of policies
that regulate industry interactions in institutions with lower
levels of NIH funding.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001743.
N The UK General Medical Council provides guidance on
financial and commercial arrangements and conflicts
of interest as part of its good medical practice
document, which describes what is required of all
registered doctors in the UK
N Information about the American Medical Student
Association (AMSA) Just Medicine campaign
(formerly the PharmFree campaign) and about the
AMSA Scorecard is available
N Information about the Institute on Medicine as a
Profession (IMAP) and about its Conflicts of Interest
Policy Database is also available
N ‘‘Understanding and Responding to Pharmaceutical
Promotion: A Practical Guide’’ is a manual prepared by
Health Action International and the World Health
Organization that medical schools can use to train
students how to recognize and respond to pharma-
ceutical promotion
N The US Institute of Medicine’s report ‘‘Conflict of
Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice’’
recommends steps to identify, limit, and manage
conflicts of interest
N The ALOSA Foundation provides evidence-based,
non-industry-funded education about treating com-
mon conditions and using prescription drugs
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